Charles H. Green

I am a final year PhD Candidate and Graduate Teaching Assistant in Philosophy at King's College London.

My research mostly focuses on topics in philosophy of mind, general philosophy of science, and metaphysics. More specifically, I work on the metaphysics of perception and sensory consciousness, theoretical reduction and emergence in science, the metaphysics of properties, and the relationship between perceptual and scientific objectivity.

My PhD thesis, supervised by Professor Bill Brewer and Dr Alexander Franklin, argues that naïve realism about perception is consistent with an unorthodox kind of reductive physicalism. I defend a functionalist account of theoretical reduction which I argue can describe the ontological dependencies of the causal powers of phenomenal properties on lower-level physics, whilst still allowing for the more thoroughgoing realism about qualitative character that naïve realism requires. This result has broad implications for the hard problem of (sensory) consciousness, and the relationship between scientific and metaphysical explanations.

I have taught undergraduate seminars and workshops at King's College London on philosophy of mind (for neuroscience students), logic, metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of physics, philosophical methodology, and philosophy of medicine (for medical students). I have also acted as co-convenor for the philosophy of medicine course.

My full academic CV and draft publications are available on request. Please contact me here.